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CORRESPONDENCE

Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to
Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig
Lynn M. LoPucki *
The same amount of smoke would be released from the factory's
chimney whether the factory owner or the householder was legally
responsible for the smoke damage. If this proposition strikes you as
incredible on first hearing, join the club. The world of zero transaction costs turns out to be as strange as the physical world would
be with zero friction.
- George J. Stigler1
INTRODUCTION

The beating of the drums grows louder. In academia, they beat for
a market-based solution to the problem of bankruptcy reorganization.
The product is a steady procession of articles, each calling for the market to play a larger role. Most deposit a specific proposal for reform as
therr offering at the academic altar. 2 Outside academia, the drums
• Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin, A.B. 1965, J.D. 1967, Michigan; LL.M. 1970,
Harvard. - Ed. I wish to thank Samuel Bufford, Bill Campbell, Blair Kauffman, Neil Komesar,
Donald Korobkin, Marjorie Murphy, Bryan Schneider, Grace Shohet, David Skeel, John
Thomure, Jay Westbrook, and William Whitford for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this article. My coresearcher, William Whitford, generously consented to the use of data from
our study, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, that
has not been included in joint publications. I am grateful for valuable research assistance provided by John Thomure.
1. George J. Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 11-12 (1972).
2. Each of the publications listed in the next paragraph questions the usefulness of chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code; each employs a model that in at least certain respects assumes that
capital markets are perfect or near perfect and that transaction costs are nonexistent or insignificant. Proposals for reform are noted.
The suggestion to eliminate chapter 11 was first made by either Baird or Jackson in 1986.
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LoGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 223 (1986) ("There is no
reason why chapter 7 could not be used as the vehicle to sell the firm as a going concern in the
same way that companies go public."); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 128 (1986) ("[T]he entire law of corporate reorganizations
is hard to justify under any set of facts and virtually impossible when the debtor is a publicly held
corporation."). It has been repeated numerous times. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and
Risk Allocation, 77 CoRNELL L. REv. 439, 489 (1992) ("Congress should repeal bankruptcy's
reorganization provisions."); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations,
101 HARV. L. REv. 775, 785 (1988) (proposing to substitute a scheme of reorganization in which
shareholdings are canceled without compensation unless shareholders pay their prorated share of
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sound a different message: chapter 11 poorly serves the public by
holding creditors at bay and thereby protecting incompetent managers
against the natural consequences of their own mismanagement.3 In
their provocative call for the repeal of chapter 11,4 Michael Bradley
and Michael Rosenzweig have fused these highly resonant themes
with data that purport to show the virtually complete failure of chapter 11 to serve the interests of either creditors or shareholders. With
publication of this powerful product in the Yale Law Journal, the
questioning and complaining about chapter 11 have given way to demands for action. Those demands have captured the attention of the
financial press5 and threaten soon to reach the body politic. 6
all debts of the company within four days after notice); James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in
the Shadow ofMurphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88
MICH. L. REv. 2097, 2141 (1990) (employing assumptions of perfect markets and other hypo-

thetical conditions to demonstrate that bankruptcy is unnecessary because debtors will liquidate
and distribute their own assets: "The purpose of this study has been to demonstrate that we lack
any persuasive theory for why we have or ought to have bankruptcy legislation."); Philippe
Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform (May 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) (employing Bebchuk's new approach as part of a "market-based" proposal that
would substitute for chapter 11). But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 411 (1990) (implicitly employing perfect market zero transaction cost
assumptions to argue that, because chapter 11 endures, it must be efficient).
3. E.g., Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Time to Scuttle Chapter 11, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 1992, § 3, at 13 ("[W]e believe that the principal beneficiaries of Chapter 11 are corporate managers..•• Chapter 11 ..• in fact serves mainly to protect managers' jobs."). Kallen
argues as follows:
During the Eighties, Chapter 11 became ..• a powerful tool of megacorporations • • • •
Chapter 11 permitted megacorporations . . • [and] the men who ran them to escape the
consequences of their greed and incompetence. If viewed as a government program to provide large amounts of aid to giant corporations, the Bankruptcy Code has been one of the
most successful federal programs.
LAURENCE H. KALLEN, CoRPORATE WELFARE: THE MEGABANKRUPTCJES OF THE 80s AND
90s, at ix (1991); see also A New Ending for Chapter 11, THE EcoNOMIST, Feb. 24, 1990, at 13
("The managers of bankrupt companies are still consigned to the flames in some countries ••••
But when a big business files for reorganisation under chapter 11 of America's bankruptcy laws,
it is all too often not the firm's managers who fry.").
4. Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11. 101 YALE
L.J. 1043 (1992).
5. Articles about Bradley and Rosenzweig's article abound. See, e.g., Emily Barker, Pair
Puts Spotlight on Chapter 11 's Flaws. AM. LAw., May 1992, at 119; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra
note 3, § 3, at 13 ("[W]e believe that the principal beneficiaries of Chapter 11 are corporate
managers.•.• Chapter 11 •.• in fact serves mainly to protect managers' jobs."); Wade Lambert
& Milo Geyelin, Bankruptcy Lawyers Dispute Call for Scrapping Chapter 11 Process, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 19, 1992, at BS (describing efforts of a group of bankruptcy lawyers to organize in
opposition to the Bradley-Rosenzweig proposal); Andrew Leigh, Are Federal Bankruptcy Laws
Failing in Their Mission?, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Apr. 9, 1992, at 4 (describing the Bradley
and Rosenzweig study, quoting Rosenzweig and several critics); Allen R. Myerson, Rethinking
the Law That Gives Golden Eggs After the Goose Is Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992, § 4, at 2
(referring to the Bradley and Rosenzweig proposal as "[t]he most radical, attention-getting" and
referring to the possibility of repeal as "unlikely"); Peter Passell, Economic Scene: Fun, Games,
Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1992, at D2; Michelle Singletary, Panel Votes to Form Bankruptcy Study Body, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1992, at Fl.
6. See, e.g., John Greenwald, The Bankruptcy Game, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 60 ("A recent
Yale Law Journal article called for junking Chapter 11 altogether and letting sick companies
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Much about chapter 11 is in need of improvement. But, as is so
often the case, the resonant themes are not the right ones. All three
legs of Bradley and Rosenzweig's argument for repeal are seriously
flawed. The heart of their empirical argument is their claim to have
shown that financially stronger companies reorganizing under chapter
11 have been paying less to both their creditors and their shareholders
than did weaker companies reorganizing under prior law. In Part I
below, I present several more plausible explanations for the stock and
bond price phenomena they observed. In all likelihood, their data re:flect not a difference in the efficiency of the Act and Code regimes, 7 as
they claim, but merely the arrival of the junk bond era. Chapter 11 is
processing more highly leveraged companies.
Bradley and Rosenzweig's provocative assertion that chapter 11
shields managers from creditors while they expropriate for themselves
the wealth of both bondholders and stockholders in no way follows
from their empirical findings, nor is it true. In Part II, I present empirical evidence from several studies to show that during the reorganization of large, publicly held companies, managers are rarely the
powerful actors that Bradley and Rosenzweig make them out to be.
Reorganization managers are more likely to serve creditor interests
directly or pursue some more complex course calculated to keep
everybody happy and thereby preserve their jobs and reputations.
The third leg of Bradley and Rosenzweig's argument for repeal of
chapter 11 is their assertion that, in its absence, the conflicts between
failing companies and their creditors could be regulated through contracts and markets. In Part III, I argue that their analysis depends so
heavily on the twin assumptions of perfect capital markets and zero
transaction costs that it is not helpful in evaluating the usefulness of
die."); Aaron Pressman, Can Chapter 11 Be Put Back Together?, INV. DEALER'S DIG., Apr. 27,
1992, at 16 (linking the Bradley and Rosenzweig article with bankruptcy reform legislation currently pending in Congress). In what was seemingly a response to the Bradley and Rosenzweig
article, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist commented:
Chapter 11 has many detractors and some go so far as to reject the notion that financially
troubled firms should be able to reorganize instead ofliquidat[e]. They argue that Chapter
11 has a pro-debtor, pro-incumbent management bias that does not foster efficient allocations of assets. I suspect the debate over these arguments will make the pending bankruptcy
reform efforts a lively undertaking.
Remarks of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Annual Spring Meeting of the American Bankruptcy Institute, May 18, 1992, AM. BANKR. INST. BULL., May 20, 1992, at 1.
Articles defending chapter 11 have begun to appear, suggesting that it is now "in play." See,
e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 2 (arguing that, because chapter 11 endures, it must be efficient);
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Is a Better Alternative, NATL. L.J., Apr. 20, 1992, at 15.
7. Bradley and Rosenzweig refer to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as the Act and to
filings as pre-Act or post-AcL Their usage is disconcerting to both bankruptcy scholars and bankruptcy practitioners who have, for the past 14 years, consistently referred to the pre-1978 legislation as the Act and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as the Code. I employ the terminology
that is in common use.
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chapter 11. Their strange visions of debtor-creditor relations after repeal of chapter 11 are the unique product of the strange world in
which they conduct their analyses. In Part IV, I generalize from the
critique of Bradley and Rosenzweig's proposal to a more general critique of the use of perfect market zero transaction cost models in the
evaluation of procedures for bankruptcy reorganization and perhaps
other legal regimes as well.
I.

ARE SOCIAL COSTS HIGHER UNDER CHAPTER 11?

The empirical leg of Bradley and Rosenzweig's argument rests on
an apparent anomaly. They show that the companies filing for bankruptcy reorganization since October 1, 1979 (the Code-filing companies)8 were, by several measures, financially stronger as they
approached bankruptcy than were the companies filing before October
1, 1979 (the Act-filing companies). 9 The apparent anomaly is that, as
the companies approached bankruptcy, the equity and debt securities
of the still stronger Code-filing companies lost a larger proportion of
their value than did the debt and equity securities of the weaker Actfiling companies.
The difference in the losses was dramatic. Over the two-year period preceding bankruptcy, stockholders of the Act-filing companies
lost only a little more than $.50 per dollar of investment, while stockholders of the Code-filing companies lost nearly all of their investment.10 In the period beginning twelve months before filing and
ending six months after filing, bondholders of the Act-filing companies
lost only 42% of their investment while bondholders of the Code-filing
companies lost 70% of their investment. 11 From these data, Bradley
and Rosenzweig reach their direct empirical conclusion that financially stronger Code-filing companies were making smaller distributions to both shareholders and bondholders than financially weaker
Act-filing companies. To those familiar with the delivered wisdom of
bankruptcy reorganization, this conclusion is startling; the Code procedures for reorganization are generally regarded as vastly superior to
the corresponding procedures of the Act.12
8. See supra note 7.
9. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1063.
10. Id. at 1068.
11. Id. at 1072.
12. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 190 (2d ed. 1991) ("[l]t became increasingly obvious that the [Bankruptcy] Act was
hopelessly out of date...• The bankruptcy system was perceived to be so obsolete [prior to
adoption of the Code] that Congress went so far as to make the Rules control over the statute
itself in case of conflict."); id. at 429 ("A case can be made that the benefits of the new provisions
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Bradley and Rosenzweig's argument to the point of their direct
empirical conclusion depends upon some questionable inferences. 13
But the central flaw in their empirical analysis is in their implicit assumption that, by showing that the bondholders of Code-filing companies fared worse, they had shown that the creditors of Code-filing
companies fared worse. 14
Bradley and Rosenzweig describe their empirical exercise in a series of formulae. To understand the significance of their error in treating bondholders as a surrogate for creditors, one need understand only
the following definitions and formula:
V - Market Value of Financial Claims 15
E - Earnings Potential16
F - Filing Frequency
T - Total (Social) Costs of Voluntary Bankruptcy
T=F*[E-V]
That is, the social costs of bankruptcy are equal to the number of
cases, multiplied by the amount lost in each case. In a very general
outweigh the obvious loss of protection for widely scattered and relatively powerless public
debtholders and stockholders. The principal benefit might be that companies will enter Chapter
11 earlier and therefore will be healthier and more likely to survive when they do..•• [T]here
may be an important benefit in jobs saved and investments protected.").
13. For example, in using the market values of financial claims from the period approaching
bankruptcy as a surrogate for the distributions made to claim holders under chapter 11, Bradley
and Rosenzweig implicitly assume that the market correctly anticipated the distributions. In an
empirical study of cases under the Act, Altman reached the conclusion that the market systematically overvalued equity shares in the period approaching bankruptcy. EDWARD I. ALTMAN,
CoRPORATE BANKRUPTCY IN AMERICA 79 (1971). Altman's finding provides an alternative
explanation for some portion of the relatively high returns to shareholder observed by Bradley
and Rosenzweig in Act cases, though its applicability depends on the additional, unproved assumption that the market became more sophisticated about bankruptcy in the 1980s.
I express other reservations about Bradley and Rosenzweig's design infra notes 17, 20, and
21.
14. The assumption is introduced in the following passage:
Despite the relative financial strength of [Code-filing] bankrupt firms, both stockholders and
bondholders of such firms have experienced significantly greater losses in the [Code] period.
These results, we believe, suggest that the [Code] has increased management's freedom to
pursue self-interested operating strategies at the expense of the firm's security holders. The
[Code], in other words, has weakened the ability of creditors to monitor management effectively .•••
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1067 (emphasis added).
Later in their article, Bradley and Rosenzweig list the "stakeholders" in a chapter 11 case.
Id. at 1056 & n.44, 1088 & n.108. The omission of other kinds of creditors from those lists
suggests that Bradley and Rosenzweig considered the bondholders to be representative of creditors generally, and never contemplated that the missing money might in fact have gone to other
creditors.
15. In the term Financial Claims the authors include both debt claims against, and equity
interests in, the company. See id. at 1057.
16. The authors use the companies' earnings in the years approaching bankruptcy, as shown
by accounting numbers, as a surrogate for the entire stream of income that the company would
earn in the future, reduced to present value. See id. at 1055-57 & n.45.
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sense, the proposition holds intuitively. If the present value of the future earnings of a company facing reorganization (E) is significantly
greater than the market value of its debt and equity (V}, the market
must anticipate that some of those future earnings will never reach the
holders of debt and equity. Bradley and Rosenzweig denominated the
amount the market expected would go elsewhere as T and called it the
Total (Social) Costs of Voluntary Bankruptcy.17
To avoid the intractable problem of attempting to place a value on
future earnings without resorting to market values, 18 Bradley and Rosenzweig adopted a risky empirical strategy. If Filing Frequency and
Earnings Potential both increased at the same time that the Market
Value of Financial Claims decreased, it would then follow that the
Social Costs of Voluntary Bankruptcy must have increased.
Bradley and Rosenzweig had little reason to be concerned about
the numbers of filings: it is common knowledge that the filing rate was
much higher under the Code than it had been under the Act. That the
companies filing under the Code were financially stronger was not
common knowledge, but it was at least plausible. 19 Bradley and Rosenzweig presented empirical evidence that it was true. 20
17. In so doing, Bradley and Rosenzweig attributed all costs not otherwise accounted for to
bankruptcy.
18. Actually calculating the values of the Earnings Potentials of reorganizing companies
would have required knowing two unknowable kinds of information: what the future earnings of
the companies would have been without the deadweight costs of bankruptcy; and the rate of
capitalization the market should apply to those earnings. Bankruptcy scholars and practitioners
often express their disdain for attempts to fix these kinds of values in Peter Coogan's pointed
epithet that the present value of a future earnings stream is a "guess compounded by an esti·
mate." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 222, reprinted in 1918 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6181, quoted in Peter F. Coogan, Confirmation of a Plan Under the Bankruptcy Code, 32 CASE
W. R.Es. L. REv. 301, 313 n.62 (1982) (noting that Professor Coogan himself is uncertain
whether his phrase was as quoted above or, conversely, "an estimate compounded by a guess" as
he is quoted in H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 225, reprinted in 1918 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6184).
19. One would expect that, among the companies that actually contemplate bankruptcy,
those in the worst financial condition would have the most to gain from filing. Therefore, if the
filing rate increased abruptly after adoption of the Code, as it did, the additional filers would
presumably be companies not in such bad financial condition that they could benefit from filing
Ullder the Act, but in bad enough condition that they could benefit from filing under the Code.
There is at least one problem with this assumption: the additional filers may have included some
companies in desperate need of bankruptcy relief, but not legally permitted to file for reorganization under the old law. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
20. The evidence is less than entirely convincing. The Bradley and Rosenzweig data show
that the earnings of Act·filing companies deviated further below the norm for companies of the
Act period than the earnings of Code.filing companies deviated below the norm for companies of
the Code period. But the data also show that, as bankruptcy approached, the earnings of Actfiling companies deteriorated at a slower rate than the earnings of Code-filing companies. Bradley and Rosenzweig attribute the sharper decline in Code-filing companies to "management's
actual stewardship of the firm in bankruptcy," Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1064 n.60,
but that renders their argument somewhat circular. The alternative interpretation is that the
Code-filing companies were in weaker financial condition in the sense that their earnings were in
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That the Market Value of Financial Claims against reorganizing
companies would be lower was the least plausible of the propositions
Bradley and Rosenzweig's strategy required them to prove. They began by breaking the problem down into two parts: debt and equity.
They then attempted to demonstrate that the market values of both
debt and equity of Code-filing companies declined more as bankruptcy
approached than did the corresponding values for Act-filing companies. Satisfied that each value had done so, Bradley and Rosenzweig
concluded that the sum of the two values must have done so. 21
Unfortunately, in determining that the value of the debt of filing
companies had declined, Bradley and Rosenzweig made a classic error
in methodology. Its nature is best captured in a joke that empirical
researchers like to tell. A Samaritan offers to help in the search for a
valuable item on a generally dark sidewalk. Noting that the Searcher
is looking only in the small area lighted by a street lamp, the Samaritan asks whether that area is where the Searcher lost the item. "No,"
the Searcher replies, "but the light is better here." In gathering their
data on change in the value of debt claims against the reorganizing
companies, Bradley and Rosenzweig looked only where the light was
good. That is, they considered only publicly traded debt (bonds). Undoubtedly, their reason for doing so was that market values for the
publicly traded debt were published, while market values for other
sharper decline. For another argument that Code·filing companies may actually have been
stronger financially than Act-filing companies, see infra note 29.
Bradley and Rosenzweig's experimental design rests on the central tenet that the value of a
company should be a direct function of its current earnings. Bradley and Rosenzweig infer the
increase in social cost in the Code period from the supposedly more rapid increase in earnings
than company value from the Act period to the Code period. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note
4, at 1057-58. Why this tenet should hold for companies with positive earnings is apparent: the
higher these earnings, the greater the cash flow likely available to shareholders.
But the "earnings" Bradley and Rosenzweig examined to determine what the companies they
studied "should" have been worth were net cash flows at all. They were nearly all losses. Id. at
1064 n.59. That is, even though neither company A nor company B recorded positive earnings,
Bradley and Rosenzweig assume that, if the losses of company B are higher than the losses of
company A, the stock of company B should sell for less than the stock of company A.
It should be obvious, however, that the purchaser of stock in a company that is losing money
is not gauging the value of the company principally by its current earnings. So gauged, the value
of the company would be negative, and the stock would be worthless. The purchaser of such
stock is likely gauging the value of the company principally by the resale value of the company's
assets or the positive earnings expected at some future date. That is, the purchaser has concluded
that the current losses are not a good indicator of the company's future or its value. To assume,
as Bradley and Rosenzweig did, that negative earnings alone should be a reasonably accurate
predictor of company value is to engage in a leap of faith.
21. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1057. From the finding that the Market Value of
Financial Claims of Code-filing companies declined faster as bankruptcy approached, Bradley
and Rosenzweig inferred that the Market Value of Financial Claims of Code-filing companies
was lower. In making this inference, Bradley and Rosenzweig implicitly assumed that Market
Value of Financial Claims for Code-filing companies and Act-filing companies were equally high
at the beginning of the holding periods. The assumption may or may not be warranted.
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kinds of debt were not readily available. 22 The data Bradley and Rosenzweig collected showed that the market values of the traded debt
had decreased; they assumed without commenting that the market
values of the nontraded debt had done the same. 23
Substantial reason exists to believe that, if Bradley and Rosenzweig
had looked beyond the light of the published trading data, their findings would have compelled them to reach a different conclusion. Table 1 shows the role played by bond financing in the debt structure of
the Code-filing companies that Whitford and I studied. Table 2 summarizes key aspects of the data contained in Table 1.
TABLE

1

Amounts are stated in millions of dollars. The data in this table were
drawn primarily from the descriptions of debt contained in the plans
and disclosure statements filed by these companies with the bankruptcy courts.
Subordinated Debt
Bonds
Not Bonds
Air Florida
AM International

Amarex
Anglo Energy
Baldwin-United
Braniff Airlines
Charter Company
Combustion
Equipment
Continental Airlines
Cook United
Crystal Oil
Dreco Energy
Energetics
EPIC
Evans Products
FSC
HRT
Itel Corporation
Johns-Manville

$48.6
$51.4
$18.1
$38.9
$25.0
$136.0

All Other Debt
Bonds
Not Bonds
$304.9
$281.7+
$178.6
$122.3+
$108.6
$292.5
$49.8
$1,085.20
$15.0
$101.1+

$13.5
$73.9
$18.7
$97.5

$3.7
$123.1

$6.0

$7.0
$110.0
$75.0

$213.6+
$607.2
$76.1+
$193.9
$154.9
$96.6
$1,162.0
$730.0
$82.5+
$127.7
$1,184.0
$2,727.0+

22. In our recent study of the bankruptcy reorganization of large, publicly held companies,
William C. Whitford and I deliberately looked outside the light. With substantial funding from
the National Science Foundation and other sources, we developed a methodology for valuing the
distributions to nontraded unsecured debt and applied it in 41 of the 43 cases we studied. See
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization ofLarge, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 135, 141 (1990). To
apply those data to prove or disprove Bradley and Rosenzweig's thesis would require a project of
similar scope and cost to value distributions in comparable Act cases.
23. See supra note 14.
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KDT
Lionel Corporation
Marion
McLouth Steel
MGF
Nu Corp
Oxoco
Penn-Dixie Steel
Phoenix Steel
Pizza Time Theatre
Revere Copper
Salant
Sambo's Restaurants
Saxon
Seatrain Lines
Smith International
Storage Tek
Tacoma Boatbuilding
Technical Equities
Towle Mfg.
Towner Petroleum
White Motor
Wickes Companies
Wilson Foods
Totals

Co"espondence

Subordinated Debt
Not Bonds
Bonds
$21.2
$13.4
$20.0
$99.8
$119.1
$48.0
$19.1
$4.0
$51.6
$41.2

$4.8

$43.5
$47.5
$130.9
$13.0
$10.0
$25.0
$17.2
$75.9

$252.4

$1,414.1

$297.9

87
All Other Debt
Not Bonds
Bonds
$63.0+
$143.7+
$226.1
$5.2
$141.4+
$127.8+
$1,003.5
$4.5
$111.2
$3.1
$27.5+
$119.0
$84.3
$215.3
$62.0+
$105.0+
$276.8+
$292.2
$77.0
$481.4+
$1,242.7
$158.6
$492.1
$57.4
$146.3
$13.7
$194.6+
$148.1
$942.0+
$85.8
$49.7
$666.7
$16,521.5+

+

indicates that the amount is understated because the amount for some component (usually
secured debt) is unknown

TABLE

2

Total bond debt
Total nonbond debt

Amount in
millions
$2,544.8
$16,355.4

Subordinated bonds
Other bonds

$1,414.1
$666.7

Percent
of
total
11%
89%
100%
68%
32%
100%

The summary shows that bonds, the only kind of debt examined by
Bradley and Rosenzweig, constituted only 11 % of the total debt of
these companies as they approached bankruptcy. Most of the balance
of the debt of these reorganizing companies was in the form of loans
from financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies
(hereinafter bank debt). The summary also shows that most of the
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bond debt (68%) was contractually subordinated to the bank debt.
That is, at the time the bonds were issued, the purchasers contracted
that they would forgo payment during any period the bank debt was in
default until the bank debt was paid in full. Thus, the bonds that
Bradley and Rosenzweig examined were not only a small portion of
the total debt, but a highly atypical portion. Their atypical nature
provides the basis for several explanations of the bond value decline
observed by Bradley and Rosenzweig that do not support their conclusion of a debt value decline.
The most likely explanation for the sharper decline in bond values
in companies approaching Code filing than in companies approaching
Act filing is that the bonds of code-filing companies had more leverage
working against them. The 1980s were not only the decade of the
Code; they were also the decade of the junk bond. Between the Act
and Code periods studied by Bradley and Rosenzweig, there was a
sharp increase in corporate debt. 24 That increase resulted in only a
moderate increase in the debt-to-equity ratios of corporations only because it was accompanied by a sharp increase in the market value of
the equity of corporations.25 For the companies that filed for bankruptcy, however, the relationship between these increases was different. As Bradley and Rosenzweig report, Code-filing companies were
two to five times more highly leveraged in relation to all companies in
the junk bond era than Act-filing companies had been in relation to all
companies prior to the junk bond era.26 When these sharp deviations
of Code-filing companies from the norms of their era are added to the
moderate deviation of Code era norms from Act era norms, it becomes
clear that the debt-to-equity ratios of Code-filing companies during the
1980s must have been considerably higher than the debt-to-equity ratios of Act-filing companies.
Other factors remaining constant, the effect of higher debt-to-eq24. See, e.g., Leland E. Crabbe et al., Recent Developments in Corporate Finance, 16 FED.
REsERVE BULL. 593, 593 (1990) ("[T]he outstanding debt of the nonfinancial corporate sector
soared as corporations borrowed heavily to finance retirements of equity resulting from restructuring activity [during the last half of the 1980s]."); Henry Kaufman, Debt: The Threat to Economic and Financial Stability, in DEBT, FINANCIAL STABILITY, AND PUBLIC POLICY: A
SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL REsERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY 15, 18 (1986)
("Over the two years 1984 and 1985, the debt ofnonfinancial corporations rose by $384 billion,
while equity contracted by $99 billion.").
25. Ben S. Bemanke & John Y. Campbell, Is There a Corporate Debt Crisis?, 1 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON EcoN. ACTIVITY 83, 83-84 (1988); Crabbe et al., supra note 24, at 599 ("In particular, the ratio of debt to equity, both measured at market values, has increased only slightly since
1982, as rising equity prices have largely countered the rise in corporate indebtedness." (citation
omitted)).
26. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1094-95 (showing debt-to-asset ratios for Code
companies two to five times as high in relation to all firms as the debt-to-asset ratios for Act
companies.).
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uity ratios will be exactly what Bradley and Rosenzweig observed
among Code-filing companies: a faster decline in the value of the
subordinated debt and equity as financial problems set in. That is
what makes a junk bond junk. To see why, assume that researchers
attempting to replicate Bradley and Rosenzweig's study drew a Code
sample consisting entirely of companies worth 100, whose senior debt
was 90, whose junior debt was 5, and whose shares were worth 5 at the
beginning of the holding period. In each case, assume the value of the
company decreased by 10 as it approached bankruptcy. Assume each
company then reorganized, distributing total value of 90 in accord
with the absolute priority rule. All distributions from each of these
companies would have gone to the senior creditors; neither stockholders nor bondholders would have received anything. If the market had
anticipated the distribution perfectly, the application of Bradley and
Rosenzweig's methodology would have yielded findings that the Market Value of Financial Claims had fallen to zero. 27 The researchers
would have concluded that the Total (Social) Costs of Voluntary
Bankruptcy had absorbed the entire value of the company and that the
reorganization process had failed completely.
Had the researchers also drawn a sample of Act-filing companies
that were less highly leveraged but otherwise the same, Bradley and
Rosenzweig's methodology would have yielded a finding that the reorganization procedures of the Act were more "efficient." To illustrate,
assume that the Act sample consisted entirely of companies worth
100, with senior debt of 75, junior debt of 5, and shares worth 20 at the
beginning of the holding period. Again assume that the values of the
companies decreased by 10 as the companies approached bankruptcy.
The companies then reorganized, distributing total value of 90 in accord with the absolute priority rule. Stockholders, who received 10,
would have lost only half their investment,28 while bondholders would
have been paid in full. Though the two sets of companies performed
equally well, the Bradley and Rosenzweig methodology would have
led the researchers to conclude that the Total (Social) Costs of Voluntary Bankruptcy had been lower for the Act-filing companies. 29
27. Recall that the Market Value of Financial Claims is the total value of the stock and debt
of the company, see supra note 15, and that Bradley and Rosenzweig's methodology measures
the value of bonds as a surrogate for the value of debt. See supra note 14.
28. Cf. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1068 ("[D]uring the [Act] era, stockholders
of firms filing bankruptcy petitions lost a little more than $.50 per dollar invested over the stated
period.").
29. One possible objection to this example is that its assumption that the typical company
filing for reorganization was solvent is unrealistic. But Bradley and Rosenzweig's finding that
the equity of Act-filing companies lost only half its value in the approach to bankruptcy suggests
that many of the companies were in fact solvent. In our study of the largest, publicly held, Code-
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Another way of understanding this effect is to realize that
subordinated debt is like equity. 30 It carries high risk; it represents
only the right to what is left after others are paid; and its value depends heavily on the amount of debt to which it has been
subordinated. When Bradley and Rosenzweig measured the decline in
value of stocks and bonds, they were essentially taking two measures
of the fate of equity and leaving the typical debt unexamined.
Greater leverage also explains the apparently more rapid decline in
the value of the equity of Code-filing companies. Bradley and Rosenzweig did not measure the decline in the values of the companies, but
only in their equities. 31 Because equity was thinner in Code-filing
companies, it seemed to be disappearing more rapidly. 32
Bradley and Rosenzweig considered the possibility that the greater
losses suffered by bondholders in the Code era might have resulted
from the junk bond phenomenon. 33 They noted, consistently with the
argument I present here, that bond rating agencies judged the bonds of
their Act-filing companies to have been of significantly higher quality
than the bonds of their Code-filing companies. Nevertheless, they rejected the possibility that the Code-filing companies "generally issued
'junk bonds' while their [Act-filing] counterparts issued high-quality
bonds" because the Code-filing firms were "financially stronger (and
therefore less likely to have to resort to junk bond financings)." 34
In reaching this conclusion about the quality of bonds the companies in their study might have issued, Bradley and Rosenzweig appear
confused by the odd terminology they employ. They seem to have
forgotten that even the "financially stronger" group of Code-filing
companies were in fact losing money during the period under study3 s
filing companies, Whitford and I found that 13 of 43 were solvent in the sense that their shareholders were entitled to a distribution under a strict application of the absolute priority rule. See
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 22, at 141-43, 164-68. Bradley and Rosenzweig present data
showing abnormally high debt-to-asset ratios for companies filing during the Code era, see supra
note 26, suggesting (contrary to the main thrust of their argument that Act-filing companies were
financially weaker) that solvent companies may have been more prevalent among Act-filers.
30. See Crabbe et al., supra note 24, at 602-03 (arguing that the difference between debt and
equity as sources of corporate financing has narrowed significantly during the junk bond era).
See generally Richard E. Mendales, The New Junkyard of Corporate Finance: The Treatment of
Junk Bonds in Bankruptcy, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1137 (1991).
31. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1067-68.
32. That is, when the equity of the highly leveraged Code-filing company posited supra text
accompanying note 27 falls by 10, it registers as a 100% loss. When the equity of the corre·
sponding less highly leveraged Act-filing company posited supra text accompanying note 28 falls
by 10, it registers as only a 50% loss.
33. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1072 & n.72.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1064.
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and were probably not capable of issuing bonds of even junk grade.
The bonds dealt with in the reorganization case were almost certainly
issued at some earlier point in time. Bradley and Rosenzweig cannot
escape this argument by speculating that the Code-filing companies
were also stronger before the period covered by the study and therefore less likely to have to resort to junk bond financing; they implicitly
postulated that, at the beginning of the period of their study, the two
sets of companies were of equal financial strength. 3 6
Perhaps even more importantly, Bradley and Rosenzweig's assumption that the strength of the issuing company is the only determinant of the quality of its bonds is incorrect. Whether the bonds are
subordinated, the amount of debt to which they are subordinated, and
the total debt load of the company are all important factors in rendering bonds "junk."
Bradley and Rosenzweig's complex empirical design implicitly assumed that the variables they considered were the only ones that
changed from the Act era to the Code era. Yet there were probably
several other systematic changes that contributed to the observed decline in the distributions to bondholders under the Code. First, some
reason exists to believe that publicly traded bonds were less likely to be
subordinated during the Act period. 37 Thus Bradley and Rosenzweig
may, to some extent, have been comparing the returns on senior debt
under the Act to the returns on subordinated debt under the Code.
Some reason also exists to believe that deviations from the absolute
priority rule in favor of shareholders and bondholders have declined
between the Act era and the Code era. 38 If such a deviation occurred
36. See supra note 21.
37. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 651, 661 (1974):
Chapter X was drawn against a factual backdrop of senior debt held largely by public
investors, in opposition to equity investment often drawn from other than widespread public
sources. At present the prevailing pattern may be different; holders of senior debt may
largely be institutional investors and public investment may be mainly in the form of
subordinated debentures or preferred or co=on stock.
Bradley and Rosenzweig drew their sample of Act cases from the period 1964 to 1979. Bradley
& Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1092. To the extent that the changes described by Blum and
Kaplan occurred after the contours of the Bradley and Rosenzweig sample were fixed, the latter's
comparison of Act and Code cases compared the returns to senior bonds (under the Act) with
the returns to subordinated bonds (under the Code). That the former fare better should hardly
be surprising.
Bradley and Rosenzweig's methodology does not address this possibility. They report no
attempt to determine what proportion of the bonds they studied were subordinated. They chose
to ignore one indication that the bonds of Act-filing companies may have had better covenants:
bond rating agencies considered the bonds of their Act-filing companies to have been "of significantly higher quality." Id. at 1072 n.72; see infra text accompanying notes 33-34.
38. The evidence is sketchy. We report dollar amounts and percentages for the deviations
from the absolute priority rule in favor of equity holders under the Code in LoPucki & Whitford,
supra note 22, at 142. Other empirical evidence illustrates the size of deviations in Code cases.
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in the Act company described in the foregoing illustration, the effect
would have been to increase the value of the stocks and bonds without
increasing the Market Value of Financial Claims or improving in any
way the efficiency of Act reorganization. 39
Bradley and Rosenzweig's empirical design also assumes that companies with the same earnings ought to make the same distributions to
creditors and shareholders. That is, from the fact that Code-filing
companies with at least the same earnings as Act-filing companies40
make lower distributions, Bradley and Rosenzweig conclude that
chapter 11 is operating inefficiently. But the relationship between
earnings (in these circumstances, the size of the accounting losses being incurred by the company before it enters bankruptcy) and distribution-making capacity (essentially the market value of the company) is
loose at best.
The lack of a direct relationship is more than just a theoretical
problem with their argument. For reasons entirely unrelated to the
efficiency of bankruptcy reorganization, a substantial number of Codefiling companies probably had less distribution-making capacity per
dollar of earnings than did Act-filing companies. The flood of compaSee Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457 (1990) (deviations from absolute priority rule represent
7.6% of total amount awarded to all claimants); Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An
Empirical Investigation of U.S. Finns in Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747, 755 (1989) ("[The results
of this study] suggest that .•. there are large deviations from absolute priority."); Julian R.
Franks & Walter N. Torous, How Firms Fare in Workouts and Chapter 11 Reorganizations 15·
16 (September 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding median deviation
from absolute priority rule in favor of equity 1.2% of estimated firm value; average deviation in
favor of all security holders 2.7% of estimated firm value).
Unfortunately, there is only anecdotal evidence of the size of deviations in cases under the
Act. Theoretically, deviations from absolute priority should have been impossible because the
plan was drafted by a court-appointed trustee and had to be approved by the court for compli·
ance with the absolute priority rule. 6A JAMES W. MOORE & LAWRENCB P. KING, COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ~ 11.06, at 208-09 (14th ed. 1977). But during the Act era, the Securities Ex·
change Commission actively participated in chapter X cases and may have been effective in fore·
ing significant deviations in favor of the publicly held securities. Indeed, some argue that chapter
X practice deviated from the theory to so great an extent that the consequences were apparent
even in the reported cases. See Note, Absolute Priority Under Chapter X -A Rule of Law or a
Familiar Quotation?, 52 CoLUM. L. REV. 900, 909-20 (1952). The involvement of the Securities
Exchange Commission has been greatly reduced under the Code. See, e.g., WARRBN & WESTBROOK, supra note 12, at 428-29.
39. For example, assume that the 90 available for distribution from one of the Act-filing
companies in the example supra text accompanying notes 27-28 was distributed as follows: 70 to
the senior debt, 5 to the junior debt, and 15 to shareholders. Seeing only the 5 and the 15 in the
light of the street lamp, by Bradley and Rosenzweig's methodology, the researchers would have
concluded that the Total (Social) Costs of Voluntary Bankruptcy had been further reduced be·
cause bondholders were still being paid in full while shareholders were now losing only one
quarter of their investment.
40. While Bradley and Rosenzweig's data show that the financial losses of Code-filing com·
panies were more abnormally high than the financial losses of Act-filing companies, the differences were minimal. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1064.

October 1992]

Co"espondence

93

nies that filed under the Code included a type with limited distribution-making capacity that had been partially barred from filing under
prior law: terminally ill companies that could not be reorganized but
only liquidated.41 Bradley and Rosenzweig's methodology makes no
allowance for this change in the type of company coming into chapter
11; it holds liquidating companies to the same standards as reorganizing companies. When terminally ill Code-filing companies fail to produce as much wealth for shareholders and creditors as reorganizable
Act-filing companies with comparable accounting losses before filing,
Bradley and Rosenzweig conclude that something is wrong with chapter 11. But, just as last year's tax return may not show that the taxpayer's future earning capacity was sharply diminished by a terminal
disease, last year's income statement42 for a fatally ill company may
not reflect the hopelessness of the company's condition.43 Permitting
terminally ill companies to liquidate under the Code, instead of dying
quietly outside the light of the street lamp as many presumably did
during the Act regime, undoubtedly lowers the ratio of distributions to
Earning Potential. But it does not prove the hospital inefficient.44
41. Under the Act, the use of Chapter XI to liquidate a company was generally considered
improper. The leading case was In re Pure Penn Petroleum Co., 188 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1951), in
which the court stated:
But notwithstanding the breadth of the definition of an arrangement under Chapter XI, the
arrangement must comprehend something more than a mere surrender by the debtor of all
his assets for liquidation and distribution to creditors; an arrangement is defined as a "plan
of the debtor," but there is no "planning" by a bankrupt in proposing that his creditors be
given what the law provides in liquidation under straight bankruptcy.
188 F.2d at 885 (quoting a 1950 edition of CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY). To be sure, the bar
against using chapter XI to liquidate was imperfect. Probably many debtors filed with the full
intention of later declaring an "emergency" that would warrant a sale of the business. A large
company that sought only liquidation could file under chapter X if management were willing to
step aside in favor of a trustee. But the formal bar against filing chapter XI for the purpose of
liquidating probably also rendered liquidation less common under the Act.
The Code, on the other hand, specifically authorizes the use of chapter 11 plans that provide
for the "sale of all or any part of the property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § l 123(a)(5)(D) (1988).
Under the Code, the use of Chapter 11 to liquidate a company is common. See Lynn M.
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly
Held Companies, 78 CoRNELL L. R.Ev. (forthcoming April 1993) (manuscript at 10-12, on file
with author) Qiquidations were common in chapter 11; on the average, the companies emerging
from chapter 11 were less than one half the size of the companies entering chapter 11).
42. Bradley and Rosenzweig used actual past earnings, as reported in the firm's accounting
statements, as the measure of its "Earnings Potential." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at
1057 n.45.
43. See supra note 20.
44. Admittedly, it does not prove the hospital efficient, either. If liquidations were accomplished without a bankruptcy filing, as Bradley and Rosenzweig advocate, it is possible they
would be more efficient. But the decision in 1979 to permit liquidations to take place under the
direction of the debtor in possession in chapter 11 was a rejection of that argument. The legislative history does not give reasons for the change. But to those familiar with nonbankruptcy
liquidations, the reasons are obvious. Without the supervision of a court, the battle over the
remains of a failed company is rife with costly, wasteful strategizing. See generally LYNN M.
LoPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 45-136 (2d ed. 1991).
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That effects such as these could account for Bradley and Rosenzweig's observations does not mean that they do. The returns to creditors from financially stronger companies reorganizing under the Code
may have been lower than the returns to creditors from weaker Act
companies reorganizing under the Act. But Bradley and Rosenzweig's
assertion that they have proved it is a gross exaggeration. I have
shown at least three more plausible explanations for the sharper decline in stock and bond values in Code-filing cases:
1. Code-filing companies were more highly leveraged.
2. The bonds of Code-filing companies were more likely to be
subordinated.
3. Deviations from the absolute priority rule were greater in Act era
reorganizations.

In addition, I have shown that the comparability of their samples of
Code- and Act-filing companies is suspect because the former includes
liquidating companies while the latter does not. Until Bradley and
Rosenzweig can establish that creditors, not just bondholders, got less
in Code-filing cases, their startling assertion that the Total Social
Costs of Voluntary Bankruptcy increased with adoption of the Code
simply remains unproved.
II.

ARE MANAGERS THE PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES
OF CHAPTER 11?

Having satisfied themselves that both shareholders and creditors
got less in reorganizations under the Code, Bradley and Rosenzweig
turned to the obvious next question: Where did the money go? While
they equivocate as to whether the money was lost in operations,45 was
pocketed by the managers themselves,46 or disappeared in some illdefined combination of the two, 47 they are consistent in asserting that
One of the principal functions of bankruptcy is to control insolvent debtors and prevent fraud.
Id. at 17-21.
45. For example, they attribute "the costs of court supervised corporate reorganizations" to
"one of two suboptimal managerial decisions: the acceptance of negative net present value
projects or the rejection of positive net present value projects." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra
note 4, at 1052. In other words, they attribute those costs to management's investment decisions.
46. "[T]he means by which [financial economists] imagine that managers extract wealth from
bondholders for the benefit of stockholders may well be utilized by managers to expropriate for
themselves the wealth of both bondholders and stockholders." Id. at 1051-52. "Presumably, the
longer managers can retain control of their firm, the greater the wealth they can extract from the
firm's stakeholders." Id. at 1075.
47. At one point in the article, they seem to suggest that not all of the missing money was
lost through suboptimal managerial decisions: "The costs of these suboptimal managerial decisions are a major component of the social costs of court-supervised corporate reorganizations."
Id. at 1052. At another, they blur the distinction between the incentives of managers and those
of equity holders: "Students of financial economics have long recognized the incentives of corpo-
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management are the culprits.48 They "conjecture that the [Code's]
principal beneficiaries have been corporate managers."49
Whitford and I have argued elsewhere that during insolvency, the
managers of large, publicly held companies have incentives that frequently discourage them from maximizing the values of their companies. 50 We also report largely anecdotal evidence to support the
charge that these skewed incentives have in fact taken their toll on the
value of reorganizing companies. 51 To that extent, our findings and
speculations are consistent with those of Bradley and Rosenzweig.
But Bradley and Rosenzweig go an important step further in the
charges they level against reorganization managers. They assert that
managers benefit from the reduction in the recoveries of stockholders
and bondholders. They reach their conclusion based on the implicit
assumption of only three players in the chapter 11 game: stockholders, bondholders, and managers. If stockholders and bondholders did
worse, managers must have done better.
To the extent that Bradley and Rosenzweig assert that managers
extract wealth for themselves, numerous studies contradict them. 52
Gilson was the first to publish findings that the supposedly omnipotent53 managers of companies in chapter 11 were highly likely to lose
their jobs during the case. Bradley and Rosenzweig dismiss Gilson's
findings with the assertion that "what matters is not the particular
identity of the managers running the firm in bankruptcy reorganization, but rather the latitude (and incentive) these managers have under
rate managers (equity holders) to effect wealth transfers from bondholders by embracing valuedecreasing operating strategies." Id. At a third, they seem to be suggesting that suboptimal
managerial decisions enable managers to keep their jobs. See infra note 48.
48. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1050 ("[T]he data show that Chapter 11 preserves and protects the jobs of corporate managers, not corj>orate assets.").
49. Id. at 1076.
50. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 1993)
(manuscript on file with author).
51. Id., manuscript at 3-4, 72-74, 81-83.
52. See Brian L. Betker, Management Changes, Equity's Bargaining Power and Deviations
from Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies (Mar. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (finding high CEO turnover during chapter 11 reorganization); Stuart C. Gilson,
Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockho/ders, 21 J. FIN. EcoN. 355 (1990); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, at 64-70 (finding high CEO turnover during chapter 11 reorganization);
Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms
(Sept. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding incumbent CEOs experience
large reductions in their real cash compensation after default, while new CEOs hired from
outside the firm receive large increases in cash compensation relative to the CEOs they replace).
53. Throughout their article, Bradley and Rosenzweig paint a picture of management as having tremendous power and independence from creditors. For example, they assert that "[f]iling a
Chapter 11 petition, in effect, is a way to keep control of the firm free from the intrusive monitoring of creditors." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1076.
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Chapter 11 to pursue suboptimal strategies."S4 If by that they mean
that the replacement managers will have the same independence from
creditors that their predecessors had, more recently published research
again contradicts them. Both Betker and Whitford and I have documented heavy creditor involvement in the sacking of these managers.ss
Whitford and I found that, once in office, many of the replacement
managers align with creditors. s6 Contrary to Bradley and Rosenzweig's assertion that the reorganization managers are "actors who do
not suffer the economic consequences of their actions,"S 7 the managers
of reorganizing companies appear considerably more vulnerable to
their constituencies than the managers of healthy companies.ss A substantial minority of them make their livings as professional turnaround managers. They move from financially distressed company to
financially distressed company, competing for their positions on the
strength of their reputations.s 9 Creditors usually play a substantial
role in their selection. 60 Gilson and Vetsuypens found that these managers, whose compensation was fixed in a competitive market, earned
more than the managers who held onto their offices by means of the
chapter 11 filing. 61
Bradley and Rosenzweig offer no explanation as to how managers
"expropriate for themselves the wealth of both bondholders and stockholders. "62 During our study of the bankruptcy reorganization of
54. Id. at 1077 n.77.
55. See Betker, supra note 52; LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, at 64-70.
56. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, manuscript at 78.
57. The passage reads: "[T]he principal deficiency of the existing law of corporate bank·
ruptcy is that it leaves corporate controlfar some period in the hands of actors who do not suffer
the economic consequences of their actions. Professor Gilson's findings do not suggest otherwise." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1077 n.77.
58. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, manuscript at 30-60, 64-74.
59. Id., manuscript at 54-55 & nn.169, 171.
60. Id., manuscript at 54-55.
61. Gilson and Vetsuypens found that incumbent CEOs experienced large reductions in their
real cash compensation when their companies went into default and that new CEOs hired from
outside the firm received large increases in cash compensation relative to the CEOs they replaced. See Gilson & Vetsuypens, supra note 52, at 1, 15-16.
62. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1052. In their brief economic analysis, id. at
1050-54, Bradley and Rosenzweig referenced the literature of financial economics for the proposition. that, by engaging in risky investments, managers can extract wealth from bondholders for
the benefit of stockholders. Based on their finding that stockholder wealth declined under the
Code, however, Bradley and Rosenzweig concluded that the financial economics literature must
have "mis-specified the conflict." Id. at 1051. They propose the alternative theory that the managers expropriated the wealth of stockholders and bondholders for themselves. Id. at 1051-52.
They do not, however, even attempt to explain what the mechanics of that expropriation might
have been. At times, they seem to suggest that "expropriate for themselves" does not mean that
the managers captured the value, but rather that the value was lost through suboptimal investment decisions. See supra note 45.
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large, publicly held companies, however, Whitford and I examined the
compensation and other benefits that managers extracted from their
companies. 63 Our examination included the plans and disclosure
statements, the companies' SEC disclosures, articles in newspapers
and trade journals, more than 120 interviews with lawyers who played
key roles in the cases, and othei: sources. We specifically searched for
the kinds of self-serving behavior that Bradley and Rosenzweig imagine. While we found several incidents in which managers held up their
companies for additional and probably excessive compensation64 or
won releases from liability for their own wrongdoing, 65 the amounts
involved were only a tiny fraction of the amounts that Bradley and
Rosenzweig report missing. If the managers are expropriating for
themselves the wealth of bondholders and stockholders, they are doing
it by means that neither we nor the financial writers who covered these
forty-three cases were able to detect. Bradley and Rosenzweig's image
of managers as "actors who do not suffer the economic consequences
of their actions" appears no more applicable to companies in financial
distress than to those that remain in good health.
III.

CAN THE "MARKET" SUBSTITUTE FOR CHAPTER

11?

Bradley and Rosenzweig do not purport to base their provocative
call for the repeal of chapter 11 on their empirical findings. They acknowledge that the direct implication of their finding that reorganization under the Act was more efficient than reorganization under the
Code is that Congress should repeal chapter 11 in favor of the former
law. 66 It is on the basis of their nonempirical economic analysis that
they conclude that court-supervised bankruptcy reorganization should

63. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, manuscript at 70-74.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1077 n.80 ("Strictly speaking, therefore, our data
support repeal of Chapter 11 in favor of the previous Chandler Act regime, but not necessarily
outright abolition of court-supervised corporate reorganization.").
Bradley and Rosenzweig make a second unwarranted extension of their data and analysis
when they recommend repeal of chapter 11 for all companies based on data and analysis relevant
only to large, publicly held companies. From 1981through1990, only 942 publicly held companies filed under chapter 11. See Securities Exchange Commission, Public Companies Filing
Chapter 11 Petitions (on file with author). Those filings constituted only one half of one percent
of the 194, 135 chapter 11 cases filed during those years.
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be eliminated entirely. 67
The heart of that analysis lies in the concluding section, appropriately entitled "The Perfect Markets Solution to the Chapter 11 Dilemma." There the authors demonstrate that in the "hypothetical
world of perfect markets" the problems of bankruptcy reorganization
disappear, and "there is no economic justification for judicial interference in the contractual relationship between corporate creditors and
debtors." 68 Though the section seems on its face to have been written
TABLE3
Total cases filed under Chapter 11 during the years 1981-1990
Involuntary cases were listed separately in 1981-1982
Year
Ch. 1ls
Page
Invols
Page
1981
9,881
A-72
160
A-74
1982
18,543
A-62
278
A·64
1983
20,252
A-60
n/a
n/a
1984
20,252
A-60
n/a
n/a
1985
23,374
A-78
n/a
n/a
1986
24,740
68
n/a
n/a
1987
19,901
70
n/a
n/a
1988
17,690
68
n/a
n/a
1989
18,281
60
n/a
n/a
1990
20,783
60
n/a
n/a
193,697
438
194,135
See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CoURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATI511CS (1981-1990). Bradley and Rosenzweig acknowledge that their data are limited
to publicly held companies but assert that their theoretical analysis arguably applies with equal
force to private companies and challenge those who would limit them to demonstrate why the
data for private companies, if available, would differ from the data for public companies. See
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1077 n.80.
The answer to their challenge is that their proposal relies at every tum on the existence of
efficient capital markets for both debt and equity. E.g., id. at 1081. The lack of data for private
companies results from the fact that such markets are virtually nonexistent. Bradley and Rosenzweig attempt to assert that such markets are developing. See id. at 1081 n.87. But their examples of the "small" companies whose debt and equity have piqued the interest of speculators are
actually examples of relatively large companies in comparison with the vast majority of companies that currently reorganize under chapter 11. For a sense of just how small the small companies are, see EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. TRUSTEES, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION
OF THE U.S. TRUSTEE PILOT PROGRAM FOR BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION 47 (1983) [hereinafter ABT STUDY] (showing the median assets of 236 companies reorganizing in U.S. Trustee
pilot districts to have been $313,000 and the median assets of253 other companies reorganizing
in nonpilot districts to have been $205,000); Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control: A
Case for Adoption of the Trustee System, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 203-04 (1987) (showing the
median assets of 48 companies reorganizing in the Eastern District of Wisconsin about 1983 to
have been $318,983); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under
Chapter 11 ofthe Bankruptcy Code?, 51 AM. BANKR. LJ. 99, 120-21 (1983) (showing the median
assets of 48 companies reorganizing in the Western District of Missouri about 1980 to have been
$344,363).
Bradley and Rosenzweig do not indicate the size of the companies they studied, but the
median asset size of 49 publicly held companies filing under chapter 11 from October 1, 1985 to
October 1, 1986 was $10.9 million. Securities Exchange Commission, Public Companies Filing
Chapter 11 Petitions (on file with author).
67. "In our view, however, reinstatement of the Chandler Act would be only a second·best
solution; our economic analysis in Part II strongly suggests that the best solution would be to
eliminate corporate bankruptcy reorganization entirely, in favor of our proposal." Bradley &
Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1077 n.80.
68. Id. at 1053, 1054.

October 1992]

Co"espondence

99

facetiously, the authors never crack a written smile. Instead, "building on the perfect markets solution to the Chapter 11 dilemma," 69
they propose the repeal not only of chapter 11 70 but of all other forms
of court-supervised reorganization.71
According to Bradley and Rosenzweig, in the world that would
follow, the financially distressed company would face no day of reckoning. Instead, when the company needed money to pay its debts, it
would sell additional stock. Unless the firm was insolvent someone
would always buy the stock.72 If the firm was insolvent, it would default, and the existing residual claimants (shareholders) would give up
all claims to its value. They would be ousted from control of the firm
immediately,73 without judicial intervention.74 Control would pass to
next higher priority class, who would become the new shareholders. 75
To those not already familiar with the economist's hypothetical
world of perfect markets and zero transaction costs (hereinafter the
PM-ZTC World), 16 this description must seem strange. But Bradley
and Rosenzweig's strange visions do in fact follow from the strange
assumptions upon which the PM-ZTC World is based. In their attack
on chapter 11, Bradley and Rosenzweig have pushed those assumptions to their limits and demonstrated again how great are the differences between the world in which we live and the world in which so
many economists do their thinking. A comparison of four problems
69. Id. at 1077.
70. See id. at 1088·89.
71. See id. at 1078.
72. See infra note 79.
73. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1086.
74. Id. at 1085. Bradley and Rosenzweig qualify their statement by noting: "Of course, the
courts would retain their traditional role of enforcing property rights and contracts." Id. at 1085
n.97. They cannot mean that the state courts will remove managers from office after they resolve
disputes regarding default, because such removal would be far from "immediate" as they promised. Id. at 1086 ("[T]he common equity holders would be ousted from control of the firm
immediately upon the firm's default .•••"). But neither can they mean that the state courts will
remove managers without resolving disputes. They more probably have relied on the assumption
that, in the absence of transaction costs, parties will reach an agreement that maximizes joint
wealth. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. Under that assumption, the dispute would be
resolved immediately, and the agreement itself would accomplish removal.
15. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1084.
76. In deciding to refer to this world as the PM-ZTC World, I have rejected the more commonly used Never-Never Land. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem
of Legal Culture, 1986 DUKE L.J. 929, 935 ("The Priest-Rubin result obtains only in the nevernever world of neoclassical economics, in which there are no transaction costs .••."); Bruce A.
Ackerman, Foreword: Law in an Activist State, 92 YALE L.J. 1083, 1109 (discussing "a world
very close to Coase's never-never land"); Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against
"Coaseanism'~ 99 YALE L.J. 611, 613 (1989) (discussing "never-never-world of zero transaction
costs").
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addressed by chapter 11 and Bradley and Rosenzweig's PM-ZTC solutions to those problems will illustrate my point.
1. Illiquidity. In traditional bankruptcy theory, an asset is said to
be "illiquid" when its value cannot easily be converted to cash. If the
owner is forced to sell an illiquid asset under pressure of time, in a
market in which there are too few buyers, or to buyers who must make
major expenditures to evaluate the asset, the sale price may be considerably less than the actual value of the asset. For example, state court
judicial sale procedures are widely recognized to result in sales at
prices that frequently are below the "market" value of the asset. 77
Chapter 11 addresses the deficiencies of the marketplace by offering
the owners, and more importantly the creditors, an alternative to putting the debtor's assets on the auction block. By reaching an agreement among themselves that relieves the company's financial distress,
the debtor and creditors may be able to avoid the necessity for a costly
sale at a depressed price.
In the PM-ZTC world, the problem of illiquidity does not exist.
Because the markets are assumed to be perfect, anything that has
value can be sold for that value, immediately and costlessly. A corollary to that proposition is that, if an asset cannot be sold for its putative value of $]{, it does not have that value. Perhaps the sharpest
difference between the PM-ZTC World and the world of traditional
bankruptcy theory regards initial public stock or bond offerings. In
the latter world, making an initial public offering of securities in a
financially distressed company is virtually impossible. 78 But in the
PM-ZTC World, one can make an initial public offering to save a company from financial disaster, to make the company's monthly pay77. See, e.g., Barrett v. Commonwealth Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 939 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1991)
(finding that foreclosure sale of debtor's home for between 69.5% and 77.6% of its "fair market
value" compared favorably with the typical foreclosure sale in the area).
78. In our study of the largest 43 companies to reorganize through chapter 11 in the period
from October 1, 1979 to March 15, 1988, Whitford and I found that none resolved its financial
crisis by means of an initial public offering. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, at 97; see
also Dwight Cass, Street Expects Flurry ofPost-Restructuring IPOs in the 1990s, CORP. FINANC·
ING WK., June 3, 1991, at 1 (discussing the use of public offerings by creditors after the debtor
company has emerged from chapter 11 and quoting James Harris, managing director and head of
Lehman Brothers' financial restructuring group, as saying, "You need a situation that will look
to investors like a normal, well-capitalized company"); Gretchen Morgenson, From Busto to
IPO, FORBES, Oct. 30, 1989, at 14 (noting that Cable Applications, Inc.'s initial public offering
while in chapter 11 "may be a first on Wall Street"). For a case in which a debtor attempted
unsuccessfully to emerge from Chapter 11 through a public offering, see Conforte v. United
States, 125 B.R. 287 (D. Nev. 1991), discussed in United Press International, Federal Trustee
Says Brothel Could Reopen Thursday or Friday, Sept. 19, 1990 (reporting two failed attempts by
the Mustang Ranch to emerge from chapter 11 through the making of a public offering of stock)
(available on NEXIS).
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ments,7 9 or to buy a chocolate bar. The assumption of perfect markets
enables Bradley and Rosenzweig to reach the conclusion that, in the
PM-ZTC World, when management can no longer raise capital
through the sale of stock, the debts of the company exceed the value of
its assets. 80
2. Communication and coordination. During the bankruptcy reorganization of large, publicly held companies, a great deal of time
and effort goes into coordinating the activities of the thousands of
stakeholders. Within the scheme of intermediation81 laid down by
chapter 11, the parties struggle over the appointment of official committees, 82 the precise groups the committees will represent, 83 and the
information resources they should have. 84 Communication is difficult. 85 Merely to send a formal notice to the creditors and shareholders themselves may cost hundreds of thousands of dollars and take
several months. Direct negotiations among so many parties are
79. Bradley & Rosenzweig labor over a precise statement of whether the debtor would make
a public offering to obtain the money necessary to make particular debt payments that are due:
If [the value of the firm's equity after making the payment is greater than the amount of the
payment that is due], then there is positive net equity in the firm and, assuming an efficient
capital market, managers could issue new equity shares to finance the debt payments that
are currently due. If [that expression] does not hold, then there is no equity in the firm, and
managers could not sell new equity to finance the current debt payments •..•
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1082 (footnote omitted).
80. See id.
81. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 22, at 154-85.
[R]eorganization plans are not directly negotiated by the parties in interest, but rather by
intermediaries functioning as the parties' representatives. The effects of intermediation are
compounded by perplexing layers of agency. For example, a public bondholder may be
represented in the chapter 11 case by an indenture trustee, which is usually the trust department of a bank. The bank may retain a member of a private law firm to conduct the representation. If the indenture trustee is appointed to membership on the unsecured creditors'
committee, the lawyer may be the one who attends the meetings. The committee will retain
a bankruptcy lawyer to represent itself in negotiations with the debtor and the representatives of shareholders.
Id. at 154.
82. In three of the 43 cases (7%) that Whitford and I studied, equity holders were defeated in
bids to form equity committees. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 22, at 191. Committee status
is worth struggling over; it assures that the group represented will be present at the bargaining
table and virtually assures that the group will share in the distribution under the plan, even in the
complete and obvious absence of a legal entitlement. See id. at 158-60, 190-93.
83. Even though the unsecured creditors' committee represents the holders of subordinated
debt in the absence of a separate committee, investors who acquire substantial holdings in the
subordinated debt of reorganizing companies typically seek the formation of a separate committee to represent only the subordinated debt. See id. at 160-63.
84. For example, creditors' committees generally succeed more often than do equity committees in winning the right to retain financial advisers to assist them in the process of plan formulation. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, at 118 & n.334.
85. For an illustration of the difficulty of communicating with large numbers of stakeholders,
see In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R. 211, 220-23 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991) (discussing whether
and how securities dealers who hold bonds for customers notify the customers of the vote and the
problems of authority created when the securities dealers attempt to vote the bond for or against
a plan of reorganization).
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unthinkable. 86
Under the assumptions of the PM-ZTC World, these problems
also disappear, enabling thousands of corporate stakeholders to act
virtually as one. Without transaction costs, both communications and
negotiations are free and instantaneous. The predominant strain of
the PM-ZTC World, utilized by Bradley and Rosenzweig, assumes
that parties always accept proposals that are in their interests. 87 This
powerful assumption enables Bradley and Rosenzweig to propose that
each of a debtor's creditors be entitled to have its own contract governing the firm's operating strategies and to "strictly enforce" it. 88
In a world with transaction costs, debtors might well inadvertently89 or strategically90 agree to contracts whose inconsistencies precluded their simultaneous strict enforcement. Indeed, sorting out
inconsistencies among the rights of competing creditors is frequently
cited as one of the primary purposes of chapter 11.91 But Bradley and
Rosenzweig correctly surmised that in the PM-ZTC World any incon86. For an account of the complexity of a negotiation involving approximately 400 banks, see
MICHAEL MORITZ & BARRETI SEAMAN, GOING FOR BROKE: THE CHRYSLER STORY 297·318
(1981). The Chrysler negotiations could be limited to the 400 banks because the negotiators were
willing to accept a deviation from the absolute priority rule; they permitted the nonbank credi·
tors, who had equal priority with them, to be paid in full in the ordinary course of business.
Under Bradley and Rosenzweig's proposal, no such limiting would occur. Their proposal would
"ensure adherence to the rule of absolute priority by precluding payments to junior claimants
when senior claims are not fully paid." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1085. This, they
tell us, "would eliminate uncertainties currently associated with the reorganization process and
thereby increase the utility of risk-averse investors, who would be willing to pay a premium for
the certainty afforded by strict application of the absolute priority rule." Id. (footnote omitted).
87. Critics of the Coase Theorem have called into question Coase's assumption that parties
will always settle merely because it is in their interest to settle. Coase has responded that "there
is good reason to suppose that the proportion of cases in which no agreement is reached will be
small." RONALD CoASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 161 (1988); see Stewart
Schwab, Cease Defends Cease: Why Lawyers Listen and Economists Do Not, 87 MICH L. REV.
1171, 1174-78 (1989) (reviewing CoASE, supra). Abandonment of the assumption that parties
will make the deals they should make, even if they are in a bilateral monopoly, would deflate
Bradley and Rosenzweig's argument, even in the PM-ZTC World. Chapter 11 would be neces·
sary to impose on irrational parties the deals they should have made. See, e.g., supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
88. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1087.
89. In small transactions, debtors might be beaten in the "battle of the forms." That is, they
might be bound to provisions contained in unread boilerplate on purchase orders or other con·
tract documents. In large transactions, debtors might misinterpret particular contract provisions
as consistent when they were not.
90. For example, a debtor that needed a loan and could not get it any other way might
conceal conflicting contractual obligations from a prospective later lender.
91. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 2:
The basic problem that bankruptcy law is designed to handle, both as a normative matter
and as a positive matter, is that the system of individual creditor remedies may be bad for
the creditors as a group when there are not enough assets to go around. Because creditors
have conflicting rights, there is a tendency in their debt-collection efforts to make a bad
situation worse.
Id. at 10.
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sistency among the agreements could easily be resolved by further
agreement when the inconsistency came to light. In that world, to talk
of managers "approach[ing] debtholders to strike a mutually advantageous bargain" to accept particular investment projects is entirely realistic,92 even though debt holders number in the thousands and none
can be bound without its consent. In the PM-ZTC World, the parties
could know in advance that, at the time of the renegotiation, any parties with inconsistent rights would agree on a course of action that
maximized the group's joint wealth and divided that wealth among
them in a manner that left everyone better off. 93
3. Relieffrom contractual default provisions. Another important
function of chapter 11 is to relieve debtors from the sometimes draconian provisions of loan agreements that specify the effects of default.
Bradley and Rosenzweig tell us that, under their proposal, enforcement of the creditor's bargain would occur automatically upon default. That is, the law they would have Congress adopt in place of
chapter 11 "would leave ... the definition of default to contracts ...
between the company and its claimholders," 94 and provide "for automatic cancellation of residual claims [shareholdings] in the event of
default." 95 They apparently mean that if any96 contract with a creditor goes into default, the common stock of the company will, to use
their word, "evaporate." 97 Readers who fall into the trap of analogizing to the world in which they live might be concerned about the possibility that a PM-ZTC World debtor might default on a single, small
debt, thereby converting the remainder of the company's debt to stock,
perhaps to the great distress of the latter's owners.98 In the PM-ZTC
92. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1088 n.107.
93. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
94. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1078.
95. Id.
96. My conclusion that Bradley and Rosenzweig contemplate that a single default would
trigger evaporation of the stock rests on the following passages: "This repeal of Chapter 11
would permit corporate claimants to enforce these contracts strictly in the event of default, since
the law would no longer provide for a stay of enforcement actions in that event." Id. at 1078.
(Chapter 11 provides a stay that applies to, and can be lifted with regard to, each creditor separately. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), (d) (1988)). "A critical feature of our proposal, however, is that each
creditor would be able to bind the firm to strictly enforceable default-contingent contracts." Id.
at 1084 n.94. Had they contemplated that only defaults in particular kinds of debts would trigger the cancellation, Bradley and Rosenzweig would have faced the problem of providing a remedy through which to enforce the debt that could not trigger cancellation.
97. "[Flor all intents and purposes, the firm's equity securities will 'evaporate.' " Id. at 1082.
In the PM-ZTC World, this should not be cause for alarm. Things often go in and out of existence quite suddenly.
98. In the PM-ZTC World, whether one owns debt or equity does not matter. One can be
exchanged in the perfect market for an equivalent value of the other, without incurring transaction costs. But actual debt holders often exhibit a strong preference to remain in that status. See
Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 CoLUM. L.
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World, however, that could not happen. First, because any default
would evaporate both the shares of the company and the tenure in
office of the managers, managers would put off default as long as possible. All debts would go into default simultaneously.99
Second, even if default happened otherwise, it would not matter.
For example, some bookkeeper's oversight in failing to mail a check
on time could evaporate billions of dollars of stock of a Fortune 500
company. In a world with transaction costs, that might throw the
affairs of both the company and its shareholders into chaos. But, because chaos is not Kaldor-Hicks Pareto Optimal, 100 in the PM-ZTC
World it is not a possible state of affairs. If a disorderly evaporation
were to occur,1°1 it would be only momentary. Again, the PM-ZTC
assumption that parties always agree to what is in their interests saves
the day. The creditors and shareholders would promptly meet and use
their complete information102 to select a Pareto Optimal state for the
group. That state might be a waiver of the default accompanied by
condensation 103 of managers and stock. Alternatively, it might leave
them in their gaseous state and recapitalize the company. In the PMZTC World, what capital structure was created would not matter; one
would be as good as another.104
4. Soft landings for managers and shareholders. In the world of
imperfect markets and transaction costs, extricating the productive resources of a failed business from the managers and owners who presided over the failure can be difficult. Failed owners and managers
REV. 527, 532 (1983) (arguing that creditors' preference for debt rather than equity is so great
that it frequently causes reorganizing companies to issue more debt than they can pay).
99. Bradley and Rosenzweig consistently refer to default as an event that occurs with regard
to a class of debt rather than a single creditor. See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at
1079-88.
100. See generally Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility, 49 EcoN. J. 549 (1939).
101. The subjunctive is employed to indicate that it is in fact impossible. Bradley and Rosenzweig correctly describe the PM-ZTC World default process as follows:
[T]he elimination of the firm's equity holders and the erosion of their holdings would be a
slow, orderly process.
Because of this feature, our proposal would also obviate the need for an automatic stay
• . . . [U]nder our proposal there would be little, if any, concern that nervous creditors
would race one another to the courthouse in order to convert their claims into priority
judgments against a firm on the verge of "failure."
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1085 & n.98.
102. In a world without transaction costs, it is feasible to obtain all relevant information.
"Thus," in the world imagined by Bradley and Rosenzweig, "at every point in time, capital
market agents would be evaluating the firm's securities in light of the promised payments and the
distribution of terminal values. Market participants would continually assess the firm's need and
ability to issue new shares to meet its debt obligations." ld. at 1085.
103. The reverse of evaporation.
104. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance
and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. EcoN. REV. 261 (1958).
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commonly cling to their positions, dispute default on bases both real
and imagined, and hunker down in place until the appeals have been
exhausted and the sheriff comes to eject them on the day of reckoning.
Particularly bitter ones sometimes lay waste to everything they cannot
take with them as they begin to evaporate. 105 Whitford and I have
argued elsewhere that chapter 11 plays a crucial role in removing
failed management and shifting ownership and control of large, publicly held companies to their true residual owners. 106 It does these
things in a manner that is emotionally less than satisfying107 but strikingly effective. Tainted managers are nearly certain to be removed; 108
control of an insolvent company almost invariably changes hands. 109
Bradley and Rosenzweig assert that, under their proposal, the
ouster of management from control of the failed company would occur immediately on default, 110 without the need for judicial intervention, 111 leaving the sacked managers without the leverage needed to
negotiate a deviation from the absolute priority rule. 112 Here, too,
their characterization of life in the PM-ZTC World is accurate. That
world features no day of reckoning, 113 no disputing, 114 and no ability
105. See, e.g., In re KenDavis Indus. Intl., 91 B.R. 742, 750 (Banlcr. N.D. Tex. 1988) ("Mr.
Davis instructed Locke Purnell to lay waste to all, unless the banks agreed to his terms of settlement. He dictated a war of 'scorched earth' leaving what remained after the battle to the institutional creditors.").
106. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note SO, at 78-81; LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 41,
at 17-19.
107. The current system by which failed managers are removed from office is both erratic
and unprincipled. Depending on their sense of timing and their skills, some of the failed managers of the large, publicly held companies Whitford and I studied were able to "sell" their resignations to the companies' stakeholders in return for generous severance packages and releases for
their misconduct, while others were forced out of office and subjected to both civil and criminal
litigation. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, at 70.74.
108. Whitford and I found that 95% of CEOs who led their companies into financial distress
· were out of office by the end of the chapter 11 case. Id. at 66-67.
109. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 41, at 17-19. In all but two of 30 insolvent companies
studied, controlling blocks of shares were issued to creditors. Id. at 30.31.
110. "[T]he common equity holders would be ousted from control of the firm immediately
upon the firm's default on its obligation to pay senior creditors." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra
note 4, at 1086.
111. See supra note 74.
112. "In addition, our proposal would ensure adherence to the rule of absolute priority by
precluding payments to junior claimants when senior claims are not fully paid." Bradley &
Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1085.
113. Under our proposal, there would be no "day of reckoning" and no need for a courtsupervised sale or recapitalization of the firm. Rather, as the market learned more about the
distribution of terminal values, the values of the firm's securities and its contingent securities
would adjust accordingly. Thus, the elimination of the firm's equity holders ..• would be a
slow, orderly process.
Id.
114. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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to resist the determination of the Market. 115 As they point out, the
destruction of value (as opposed to the threat of such destruction) is
flatly impossible. 116 The creditors and the would-be destroyer reach
an agreement that preserves the property and divides the resulting increase in wealth between them in such a way that both are better off
than if the property had been destroyed. 117
Chapter 11 exists solely to deal with transaction costs. It should
be apparent by now that Bradley and Rosenzweig are correct in their
conclusion that there is no need for court-supervised reorganization in
a world without transaction costs. A perfect market would be a perfect substitute for chapter 11; in a PM-ZTC world, chapter 11 should
be repealed. The issue is what significance should be accorded conclusions from the PM-ZTC World in evaluating proposals for reform of
the world in which we live.
IV.

MOVING BETWEEN WORLDS

Bradley and Rosenzweig,s economic analysis of bankruptcy reorganization tells us more about economic analysis than about bankruptcy reorganization. The way problems melt away in this PM-ZTC
World seems at first elegant, then suspicious, and finally boring.
Every new proposal seems to maximize societal wealth.
The reason is simple. In this strange PM-ZTC World, every new
proposal does maximize societal wealth. The explanation is captured
most concisely in the Coase Theorem: In the absence of transaction
costs, parties will reach an agreement that maximizes joint wealth. 118
From this Theorem is derived the invariance thesis: The parties involved in a particular legal system (imaginary world) will reach the
same efficient result regardless of initial legal entitlements. 119 Though
the deal making necessary to eliminate inefficiencies may shift wealth
among the bargaining parties, it eliminates the inefficiencies perfectly
and completely. No matter what rule or structure is legislated, when
115. One must always maximize one's utility. See infra note 126.
116. "In this hypothetical world of perfect markets, valuable finn·specific capital could never
be destroyed." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4 at 1053.
117. Bradley and Rosenzweig do not attempt to explain how the immediate ouster they
promise would come about. The method described here is my own conjecture.
118. Coase himself never directly stated the Theorem, with the result that it appears in several versions. This one comes from Schwab, supra note 87, at 1174.
119. See id. at 1178. The invariance thesis is sometimes referred to as the strong version of
the Coase Theorem. While it ignores the fact that wealth effects could feed back to affect the
precise nature of the efficient result achieved, in the context of the reorganization of large, publicly held companies, that qualification is insignificant. Wealth effects are most likely to feed
back when they give weight to a particular group's preferences regarding consumption. Id. nt
1178-83.
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the deal making is over, that rule or structure maximizes societal
wealth just as well as any other.
Unfortunately for Bradley and Rosenzweig in their call for repeal
of chapter 11, the Theorem means not only that the same amount of
smoke would be released from the factory's chimney whether the factory owner or the householder were legally responsible for the smoke
damage, 120 but also that the most efficient course will be taken to reorganize a company, whether the law entitles managers to hide themselves and their companies from creditors in chapter 11 or not.
Answers to complex social and economic problems flow so easily in a
world without transaction costs that anybody who proposes doing
anything about a perceived problem can easily be bested. Whatever is
(or can be imagined), is efficient.121
The proof for the besting of Bradley and Rosenzweig proceeds as
follows. If, in the PM-ZTC World, chapter 11 imposed large social
costs on creditors through inefficient operation of the business and
looting by management, the debt collection system would still operate
with perfect efficiency. Creditors would simply bribe122 shareholders
or managers (whichever controlled the company in the particular variant of the PM-ZTC World imagined) not to file the chapter 11 case. 123
The bribe would serve the interests of creditors because it would be
less than the costs that could be imposed on them through the chapter
11 filing; it would serve the interests of shareholders and managers
because it would enable them to walk away with more than they could
get by actually filing the chapter 11 case. The existence of chapter 11
120. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
121. Easterbrook has made an interesting use of these properties of the PM-ZTC World.
Instead of arguing from rules to the conclusion that they are efficient, he argues that the rules
must be efficient or the bargain of the parties would have been to change them. Easterbrook,
supra note 2, at 411 ("Legal rules endure because they are efficient or because they transfer
wealth. Transfers are an implausible explanation of the current bankruptcy regime, leaving efficiency as the prevailing explanation.").
122. As used here and in economic theory, the term bribe does not imply that the payment is
illegal or improper. It indicates only that one person is paying to acquire the legal entitlements
of another or induce the other to use them in a particular way. The payment proposed here
would not be illegal or improper. See infra note 123.
123. An agreement by the debtor not to file a chapter 11 case would not be legally enforceable against the debtor. See LoPucKI, supra note 44, at 104. But the shareholders could cause
the company to surrender its assets to creditors in return for a bribe (cash payment) in an appropriate amount. If bribing management were necessary (because they were assumed to have some
independence from shareholders), the propriety of the transaction could be preserved by paying
the bribe to shareholders. The shareholders would pay a portion of the money to the managers
in the form of severance pay or the purchase of the managers' employment contracts.
Bowers has developed another analysis that reaches the same happy, wealth.maximizing result without the necessity for bribes. He shows that, in the PM-ZTC World, debtors actually will
liquidate their own estates prior to bankruptcy, rendering the existence of bankruptcy irrelevant.
Bowers, supra note 2. In the PM-ZTC World, many other solutions probably exist to the problem of the social cost of bankruptcy.
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might or might not make managers and shareholders wealthier at the
expense of creditors, 124 but there is little reason to believe its continuing existence would increase Total (Social) Costs. 125 In the PM-ZTC
World, no one can do anything that does not maximize his own utility, 126 and with it the utility of society. 121 An unused chapter 11 is
harmless, so its repeal is unnecessary.12s
As the simplistic nature of this slippery World comes into focus,
the limited value of its study becomes clear. That the primary use of
the Coase Theorem has been as a tool for economists to study the PMZTC World is ironic. Consistent with the view presented here, Coase
himself saw his Theorem as a kind of reductio ad absurdum of PMZTC reasoning - proof that the PM-ZTC World was getting too
much attention:
[W]hile consideration of what would happen in a world of zero transaction costs can give us valuable insights, these insights are, in my view,
without value except as steps on the way to the analysis of the real world
of positive transaction costs. We do not do well to devote ourselves to a
detailed study of the world of zero transaction costs, like augurs divining
the future by the minute inspection of the entrails of a goose. 129

Coase's concession that study of the PM-ZTC World can give valuable
insights is necessary, but narrow. To put it in perspective, remember
that the intense study of fantasy novels can probably also give us valuable insights. 130
To date, legal scholarship has generally accorded conclusions
based on the assumptions of perfect markets or zero transaction costs
124. See Schwab, supra note 87, at 1178-83.
125. What reason there is springs from the possibility that a wealthier management class
might have different consumption preferences than a wealthier shareholder or creditor class. In
the context of the reorganization oflarge, publicly held companies, these wealth effects would be
minimal. See supra note 119.
126. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 18 CAL. L. REV. 815,
828 (1990) ("[W]hat each individual does by definition maximizes his or her utility.").
127. This proposition is inherent in the Coase Theorem. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. Not only are the parties to the immediate transaction maximizing utility, so are all
other actors in the system.
128. One could counter that, in thePM-ZTC World, repeal of chapter 11 would be effortless.
Though there would be no reason to repeal chapter 11, neither would there be reason not to
repeal it. Because all actions in the PM-ZTC World are effortless, the issue of what should be
done in such circumstances recurs. In making the textual statement, I have implicitly assumed
that the concept of inertia should apply even under the twin assumptions of perfect markets and
zero transaction costs. Whether my assumption is correct cries out for further analysis, a task I
must leave to others.
129. R.H. Coase, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment, 24 J.L. & EcoN.
183, 187 (1981). The inconsistency between Coase's own views and the uses to which his work
has been put is explored in Ellickson, supra note 76.
130. For example, many people claim to have gained insights through study of J.R.R.
TOLKEIN, THE HOBBIT (1937).

October 1992]

Co"espondence

109

a kind of presumptive validity until they can be disproved empirically.
The burden has been on the attacker to explain "why the market
failed." 131 Drawing PM-ZTC-based conclusions has assumed the
mantle of high theory; empirically refuting them has been granted a
lower status, insuring that less of it will be done. In the intellectual
environment so created, Bradley and Rosenzweig are able to acknowledge explicitly that "[t]he relevance or applicability of the perfect markets solution to the real world depends on the efficiency of the
pertinent real-world markets" 132 and then move directly to the conclusion that the perfect markets solution should be implemented by repealing chapter 11 without having to argue the efficiency of the
pertinent real-world markets.133
As yet, no one has demonstrated that any relationship at all exists
between the way things work in the PM-ZTC World and the way
things work in the world in which we live. No basis exists for assuming that, because a proposition is entirely true in the former world, it is
even a little bit true in the latter. To prove that a necessary premise of
an argument is false is to defeat the argument. By that standard, all
arguments that depend on PM-ZTC assumptions fail, as do all attempts to import conclusions from the PM-ZTC World. The assumptions of perfect markets and zero transaction costs are not
"theoretical." They are false. Their falsity renders attempts to set
public policy on the basis of conclusions reached in the PM-ZTC
World nothing more than arguments by loose analogy.
The PM-ZTC World is just one in a countless number of hypothetical worlds that the human mind can imagine. By pushing the assumptions of that strange world to their limits, Bradley and
Rosenzweig have painted a surrealistic landscape in which financial
markets guarantee the absence of financial distress and chapter 11 is
unnecessary. In their attempt to discredit chapter 11, they have instead discredited the means of economic analysis they employed. Now
that we have seen what is possible in the PM-ZTC World, perhaps we
are ready to consider that it may have little to teach us. It may be, as
131. Bradley & Rosenzweig explicitly attempt to place the burden, saying that:
In view of the work of these scholars and the theoretical and empirical analyses that we
offer, one can question whether there is any persuasive theory justifying Chapter 11 insofar
as corporate bankruptcies are concerned. It seems to us that, at the very least, proponents
of Chapter 11 ought to bear the burden of proving that it does more good than harm.
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1086 n.102.
132. Id. at 1054.
133. In fact, neither market appears to be well developed. See supra note 78 (discussing
market for public offerings); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 50, at 95-98 & nn. 271-81 (discussing market for distressed companies).
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Coase himself suggests, no more than a tautology so elegant that it has
mesmerized a generation of legal scholars.

